Knowing the informed player's payoffs and simple play in repeated games

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105888zbMATH Open1544.9105MaRDI QIDQ6604779

Takuma Habu, Elliot Lipnowski, Doron Ravid

Publication date: 13 September 2024

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesincomplete informationtransparent motives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

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