Smoothed analysis of social choice revisited
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Publication:6609149
DOI10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_17MaRDI QIDQ6609149
Alexandros Psomas, Bailey Flanigan, Daniel Halpern
Publication date: 20 September 2024
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)
Cites Work
- On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
- How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?
- Social choice and individual values
- The Impartial, Anonymous, and Neutral Culture Model: A Probability Model for Sampling Public Preference Structures
- A smooth transition from powerlessness to absolute power
- NON-NULL RANKING MODELS. I
- Smoothed analysis of algorithms
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
- Probabilistic view of voting, paradoxes, and manipulation
- A Lyapunov-type Bound in Rd
- Statistical evaluation of voting rules
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