An assignment problem with interdependent valuations and externalities

DOI10.1007/S00199-023-01538-5MaRDI QIDQ6623770

Andrew Postlewaite, Tatiana Daddario, Richard McLean

Publication date: 24 October 2024

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationassignment problemmechanism designtwo stage mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems
• Two-sided matching with interdependent values
• Efficient assignment with interdependent values
• Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Implementation with interdependent valuations
• Stable Matching With Incomplete Information
• Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
• Game Theory and Mechanism Design
• An Efficient Auction

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