Competition and recall in selection problems
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Publication:6624525
DOI10.1007/S13235-023-00539-2MaRDI QIDQ6624525
Gensbittel Fabien, Pizarro Dana, Jérôme Renault
Publication date: 25 October 2024
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
game theoryoptimal stoppingrecallsubgame-perfect equilibriaprophet inequalitiescompeting agentsjob search problemhouse selling problem
Stopping times; optimal stopping problems; gambling theory (60G40) Games of timing (91A55) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)
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