Purchasing seats in school choice and inequality
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Publication:6646171
DOI10.3982/QE2220MaRDI QIDQ6646171
Publication date: 29 November 2024
Published in: Quantitative Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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- Nonparametric identification and estimation of polychotomous choice models
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- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis
- School choice: an experimental study
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- Matching with (branch-of-choice) contracts at the United States Military Academy
- Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Demand Analysis Using Strategic Reports: An Application to a School Choice Mechanism
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Purchasing seats in school choice and inequality
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