Instance-optimal information-based voting
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Publication:6652466
DOI10.1016/J.TCS.2024.114945MaRDI QIDQ6652466
Publication date: 12 December 2024
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting
- Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
- Jury theorems with multiple alternatives
- Condorcet jury theorem: an example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation
- Probability Inequalities for the Sum of Independent Random Variables
- Voting with Limited Information and Many Alternatives
- Concentration Inequalities for Sums and Martingales
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