Benefiting from bias: delegating to encourage information acquisition

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105816zbMATH Open1539.91074MaRDI QIDQ6537234

Xin Gao, Ian Ball

Publication date: 14 May 2024

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

information acquisitiondelegationbenefiting from bias

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Optimal sequential delegation
• Informational control and organizational design
• Continuity in mechanism design without transfers
• Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case
• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• Delegation and nonmonetary incentives
• The Theory of Optimal Delegation With an Application to Tariff Caps
• The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options
• Optimal Delegation
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets

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