The expressive power of voting rules
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Publication:6549138
DOI10.1007/S00355-023-01486-YzbMATH Open1537.91087MaRDI QIDQ6549138
Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde, João Vítor Batista Ferreira
Publication date: 3 June 2024
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
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- Expressive Voting and Its Cost: Evidence From Runoffs With Two or Three Candidates
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- A NEW MEASURE OF RANK CORRELATION
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