Modifications of Boston, Taiwanese and Chinese mechanisms are not comparable via counting manipulating students

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2024.111647zbMATH Open1537.91186MaRDI QIDQ6549826

Kamil Minibaev, Artemii Lomakin, Alexander S. Nesterov

Publication date: 4 June 2024

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

manipulabilitymarket designschool choicecollege admissions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
• Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
• The modified Boston mechanism
• Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study
• Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents

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