Talking with an extremist
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Publication:6559100
DOI10.1007/S00199-023-01500-5zbMATH Open1544.91071MaRDI QIDQ6559100
Tatiana Mayskaya, Emiliano Catonini
Publication date: 21 June 2024
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Endogenous information acquisition in Bayesian games with strategic complementarities
- Learning to agree
- Convergence to agreement and the role of public information
- Stochastic orders
- When is reputation bad?
- Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- We can't disagree forever
- Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
- Agreeing to disagree
- Inattention and belief polarization
- Approximating agreeing to disagree results with common \(p\)-beliefs
- Dynamic coordination via organizational routines
- Professional advice
- Communication, consensus, and knowledge
- Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
- Bad Reputation
- Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Unidimensional Opinions
- Fragility of asymptotic agreement under Bayesian learning
- Robust multiplicity with a grain of naiveté
- Common knowledge and consensus with noisy communication
- Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets
- Forgetful updating and stubborn decision-makers
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