Folk theorem under bankruptcy
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Publication:6559465
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2024.102986zbMATH Open1544.91198MaRDI QIDQ6559465
Yosuke Yasuda, Carmen Beviá, Luis Corchón
Publication date: 21 June 2024
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Dynamic games (91A25) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Some remarks on the folk theorem in game theory
- Repeated games with \(M\)-period bounded memory (pure strategies)
- A folk theorem for dynamic games
- A strategic market game with secured lending
- Strategic market games: an introduction.
- A strategic market game with active bankruptcy
- Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining
- More on the `anti-folk theorem'
- A folk theorem for stochastic games
- Undiscounted equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with a continuum of players
- Game theory
- Dynamic Contests With Bankruptcy: The Despair Effect
- When Does Predation Dominate Collusion?
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
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