On stable assignments generated by choice functions of mixed type
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Publication:6611057
DOI10.1016/J.DAM.2024.06.037MaRDI QIDQ6611057
Publication date: 26 September 2024
Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
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