Achieving the maximum size for exchange problems with dichotomous preferences

DOI10.1007/S00199-023-01536-7MaRDI QIDQ6623773

Yan Long

Publication date: 24 October 2024

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

maximum sizeexchange problemsdominant strategy incentive-compatibilitypriority mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

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• A dynamic model of barter exchange
• Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
• The core for housing markets with limited externalities

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