Private signals and fast product adoption under incomplete information
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Publication:6634128
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.08.009MaRDI QIDQ6634128
Srinivas Arigapudi, Itai Arieli
Publication date: 6 November 2024
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27) Social learning (91D15)
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