Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems
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Publication:6634135
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.07.011MaRDI QIDQ6634135
Publication date: 6 November 2024
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
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