Optimal adaptive testing: Informativeness and incentives

DOI10.3982/TE2914zbMATH Open1419.91128WikidataQ129049146 ScholiaQ129049146MaRDI QIDQ4612469

Rahul Deb, Colin Stewart

Publication date: 31 January 2019

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

adaptive testingratchetingdynamic learningtesting experts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Strategic information manipulation in duopolies
• On the Design and Comparison of Certain Dichotomous Experiments
• Repeated Moral Hazard
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Testing in Models of Asymmetric Information
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• Wages as Sorting Mechanisms in Competitive Markets with Asymmetric Information: A Theory of Testing
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures
• A principal-agent model of sequential testing
• Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
• Optimal Contracts for Experimentation
• The Dynamics of Learning with Team Production: Implications for Task Assignment
• Uncertainty, Information, and Sequential Experiments
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments

Related Items (2)

Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification ⋮ A Nearly-Quadratic Gap between Adaptive and Non-adaptive Property Testers

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