Worst-case efficient and budget-balanced mechanism for single-object allocation with interdependent values

DOI10.1007/S00355-023-01479-XzbMATH Open1539.91066MaRDI QIDQ6541011

Aditya Vikram

Publication date: 17 May 2024

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Incentive compatible market design with applications
• Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations
• Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs
• Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus
• Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs
• Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects
• Balanced ranking mechanisms
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Efficient Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Robust Mechanism Design

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