Selling two complementary goods

DOI10.1007/S00182-023-00879-8zbMATH Open1546.91101MaRDI QIDQ6581882

Kolagani Paramahamsa, Komal Malik

Publication date: 1 August 2024

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

optimal mechanismposted-price mechanismcomplementary goodsmulti-dimensional private information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Haggling over substitutes
• Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
• The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
• Selling two identical objects
• Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands
• Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
• Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
• A property of solutions to linear monopoly problems
• Optimal Auction Design
• Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
• Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations
• Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening
• Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing

This page was built for publication: Selling two complementary goods

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6581882)