The Texas shoot-out under Knightian uncertainty

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.04.009zbMATH Open1546.91099MaRDI QIDQ6584583

Frank Riedel, Gerrit Bauch

Publication date: 8 August 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

partnership dissolutionKnightian uncertainty in gamesTexas shoot-out

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

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