Social equity in international environmental agreements
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6607030
DOI10.1007/S10898-024-01368-2MaRDI QIDQ6607030
Publication date: 17 September 2024
Published in: Journal of Global Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
Cites Work
- The impact of foresight in a transboundary pollution game
- Adaptation and the allocation of pollution reduction costs
- On fairness of equilibria in economies with differential information
- Local envy-freeness and equal-income Walrasian allocations
- Local strict envy-freeness in large economies
- Can international environmental cooperation be bought?
- Strictly fair allocations in large exchange economies
- Pitfalls in the theory of fairness
- Adapting to climate change: is cooperation good for the environment?
- Cooperation in pollution control problems via evolutionary variational inequalities
- Fairness and fuzzy coalitions
- Altruistic-like equilibrium in a differential game of renewable resource extraction
- Strict fairness of equilibria in asymmetric information economies and mixed markets
- Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 2
- Divide-and-permute
- Great fish war with moratorium
- Absence of envy among ``neighbors can be enough
- On the existence of fair allocations
- Evolutionary farsightedness in international environmental agreements
- Consistent Solutions in Atomless Economies
- Impact of social externalities on the formation of an international environmental agreement: an exploratory analysis
- Emergent collaboration in social purpose games
- Fairness and formation rules of coalitions
This page was built for publication: Social equity in international environmental agreements
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6607030)
