Aggregation of misspecified experts
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Publication:6657650
DOI10.1007/S00199-024-01552-1MaRDI QIDQ6657650
Publication date: 6 January 2025
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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- Robustness
- Bayesian social aggregation with non-Archimedean utilities and probabilities
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