Stability vs. no justified envy
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Publication:6665684
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.10.002MaRDI QIDQ6665684
Assaf Romm, Ran Shorrer, Alvin E. Roth
Publication date: 17 January 2025
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching
- Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
- Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts
- A note on job matching with budget constraints
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- Essentially stable matchings
- Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
- College admissions with affirmative action
- Matching with (branch-of-choice) contracts at the United States Military Academy
- Revealed Preference Theory
- (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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