On the farsightedly and myopically stable international environmental agreements

DOI10.1111/NRM.12154zbMATH Open1545.91208MaRDI QIDQ6582911

Dritan Osmani, Richard S. J. Tol

Publication date: 5 August 2024

Published in: Natural Resource Modeling (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

game theorycoalition formationfarsighted stabilityintegrated assessment modelingmyopic stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) History, political science (91F10) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Sticks and carrots for the design of international climate agreements with renegotiations
• Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• A model of agreements in strategic form games
• Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
• Über eine Anwendung der Mengenlehre auf die Theorie des Schachspiels.
• The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries
• Coalition formation among farsighted agents
• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition

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