Bayesian social aggregation with almost-objective uncertainty
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Publication:6631814
DOI10.3982/TE5164MaRDI QIDQ6631814
Marcus Pivato, Élise Flore Tchouante
Publication date: 1 November 2024
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
utilitarianalmost-objective uncertaintyBewley preferencesBayesian social aggregationgeneralized Hurwicz
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