Nash implementation of supermajority rules
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Publication:6665438
DOI10.1007/S00182-024-00888-1MaRDI QIDQ6665438
Publication date: 17 January 2025
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Selecting winners with partially honest jurors
- Picking the winners
- A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
- Symmetry and impartial lotteries
- Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
- Unequivocal majority and Maskin-monotonicity
- Using supermajority rules to aggregate judgments of possibly biased experts
- Aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition
- An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave
- Impartial nominations for a prize
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Characterizing minimal impartial rules for awarding prizes
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