School choice with farsighted students
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Publication:6665658
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.11.010MaRDI QIDQ6665658
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Publication date: 17 January 2025
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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- School Choice with Consent*
- Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- The Farsighted Stable Set
- THE EQUITABLE TOP TRADING CYCLES MECHANISM FOR SCHOOL CHOICE
- Rational expectations and farsighted stability
- Maximality in the Farsighted Stable Set
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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