Communication on networks and strong reliability

Cites Work

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Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
Communication via a strategic mediator
Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information
Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
Correlation without mediation: Expanding the set of equilibrium outcomes by ``cheap pre-play procedures
Reliable communication over partially authenticated networks
Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
Incentives and the structure of communication
A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network
Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals
Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation.
Secure communication in minimal connectivity models
Designing communication hierarchies
Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
Probabilistic reliability and privacy of communication using multicast in general neighbor networks
Secure message transmission on directed networks
Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems
Universal Mechanisms
Multistage Games with Communication
An Approach to Communication Equilibria
Strategic Information Transmission
Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
Perfectly secure message transmission
Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks
Mechanism design and communication networks
Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case
Hierarchical cheap talk
Long Cheap Talk

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