The fractional Boston random assignment rule and its axiomatic characterization
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Publication:6541989
DOI10.1007/S10058-023-00329-7zbMATH Open1537.91128MaRDI QIDQ6541989
Patrick Harless, Zhenhua Jiao, Yajing Chen
Publication date: 21 May 2024
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
axiomatic characterizationrandom assignmentequal-rank envy-freenessfractional Boston rulesd-rank-efficiency
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