Strategy-proof budgeting via a VCG-like mechanism

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-43254-5_23zbMATH Open1537.9111MaRDI QIDQ6546309

Reshef Meir, Jonathan Wagner

Publication date: 29 May 2024

zbMATH Keywords

participatory budgetingVCG

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

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• The Core of the Participatory Budgeting Problem
• Market equilibrium under separable, piecewise-linear, concave utilities
• Iterative Local Voting for Collective Decision-making in Continuous Spaces
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Algorithmic Game Theory

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