Auction design for value maximizers with budget and return-on-spend constraints
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Publication:6609167
DOI10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_27MaRDI QIDQ6609167
Chenyang Xu, Ruilong Zhang, Pinyan Lu
Publication date: 20 September 2024
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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- Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets
- Truthful Generalized Assignments via Stable Matching
- Budget feasible mechanism design
- Algorithmic Game Theory
- Budget feasible mechanisms on matroids
- Algorithmic mechanism design
- Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: leading examples
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