A characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem
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Publication:6575517
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2024.03.006zbMATH Open1545.91189MaRDI QIDQ6575517
Publication date: 20 July 2024
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
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