A natural adaptive process for collective decision-making
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Publication:6565779
DOI10.3982/TE5380MaRDI QIDQ6565779
Publication date: 2 July 2024
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Markov processesevolutionary game theoryprobabilistic social choicemaximal lotteriesequilibrium learning
Cites Work
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