Robust group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money: the role of tie-breaking rules
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Publication:6642842
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2024.103066MaRDI QIDQ6642842
Publication date: 25 November 2024
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
efficiencyprioritymulti-unit auctionstie-breaking rulesrobust group strategy-proofnessgeneralized Vickrey rules
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
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- Robust group strategy‐proofness
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
- On the manipulability of equitable voting rules
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