Cheap talk with two-sided private information
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Publication:6665670
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.09.001MaRDI QIDQ6665670
Publication date: 17 January 2025
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Strategic information transmission networks
- Value of public information in sender-receiver games
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- Informal communication
- Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests
- Communication between rational agents
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- A two-person game of information transmission
- Refining cheap-talk equilibria
- Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain.
- Information transmission when the informed party is confused
- Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case
- Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
- When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
- A model of expertise
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Monotone Comparative Statics
- Authority and Communication in Organizations
- Monotone Comparative Statics under Uncertainty
- Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Optimal Delegation
- Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
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