Coalition-weighted Shapley values
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Publication:6581888
DOI10.1007/S00182-023-00877-WzbMATH Open1546.91029MaRDI QIDQ6581888
Estela Sánchez Rodríguez, Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo, [[Person:6053634|Author name not available (Why is that?)]], Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo
Publication date: 1 August 2024
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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