Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off?
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Publication:6665669
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.08.012MaRDI QIDQ6665669
Li Chen, Estelle Cantillon, Juan Sebastián Pereyra
Publication date: 17 January 2025
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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- THE EQUITABLE TOP TRADING CYCLES MECHANISM FOR SCHOOL CHOICE
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Unique stable matchings
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