Bayesian stable states

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.03.008zbMATH Open1544.91224MaRDI QIDQ6565036

Gaoji Hu, Yi-Chun Chen

Publication date: 1 July 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

two-sided matchingBayesian stabilityBayesian efficiencymarket statedecentralized foundation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites Work

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• Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
• Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices
• Stable Matching With Incomplete Information
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning

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