Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule

Cites Work

Let them cheat!
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Secure implementation in allotment economies
Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
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The manipulability of the Shapley-value
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A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
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Egalitarianism under earmark constraints
Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria
On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
A simple characterization of the uniform rule
A crash course in implementation theory
Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
On the implementation of the median
The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms
Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem
Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
Feasible and Continuous Implementation
Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
Toward Natural Implementation
Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints
The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof

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